Oct. 13, 2021

Building Situational Awareness In Joint And Combined Operations: The Challenge Of The Common Tactical And Common Operational Pictures

In 1999, the US military found itself asking the same question it does today: how do you enable commanders and staff to make timely and informed decisions in uncertain environments? While technology has dramatically changed since the time the author’s article was originally published, the fundamental requirement to rapidly build and share situational awareness on the battlefield has not. Even before the year 2000, decision makers were struggling with the amount of data available through emerging sensors and how to turn this data into useful information. The development of (then known as) C4I systems was seen as part of the solution to this surge of data. The author’s message of the need to properly determine essential requirements which should drive C4I system development, and more importantly not allow the reverse to happen, is as relevant today as when published two decades ago.

Sept. 30, 2021

The Counterfire Conundrum: Acceptable Levels of Risk in Large Scale Combat Operations

This article seeks to create a broader understanding of the enduring importance of responsive counterfire for ground forces on today's battlefield. Furthermore, it hopes to use the example of counterfire to change joint force attitudes towards risk acceptance as the military looks toward more integrated multi-domain/ all-domain activities in a highly dynamic and lethal environment with strategic implications. Lastly, this article intends to reinforce the mitigation responsibilities of those who accept risk to achieve a greater degree of joint and air-ground integration and promote possible future solutions as well to lessen those burdens.

Sept. 15, 2021

Application of Allied Air Power Versus Soviet Offensive and Defensive Operations

In 1978, the US military found itself in a similar position to that of today: the force was recently practiced in war by attrition, characterized largely by low-intensity conflict and operations in the human domain after coming out of Vietnam in 1975. As our military reacquainted itself with what it knew about high-intensity conflict with a near-peer, it faced the question of how to anticipate what new asymmetries the Soviets would bring to new domains. At the time, the domains serving as new platforms for competition included the infosphere, space, and technology. In this issue of “Blast from the Past”, you will see that the 1978 Air Land Bulletins give us a glimpse into how the force was thinking about and depicting the Soviet threat.

Aug. 31, 2021

Dismantling the Clausewitzian Trinity: How China is Eroding the Means and Will of the United States to Punch Back

Frequently overlooked, China undercuts America’s innovative advantage through the purposeful use of its diaspora in US research labs and universities, which eventually reduces the asymmetries that we can bring to the battlefield. Increasingly, irregular threats and competition below the level of armed conflict thrive in permissive environments—indeed within the homeland, create a multifaceted problem for the US military, and require globally integrated operations to protect the homeland and US interests. Taking all of this into consideration, it seems that China’s strategic aims are not oriented on building its military power, but instead on winning the next great war without a shot fired.

Aug. 15, 2021

Integrating Lethal and Nonlethal Effects

There are numerous methods to effect enemy targets. Historically, the joint force focused on physical effects, which evolved into effects based operations. A traditional example of this is dropping a bomb on an enemy building with the desired effect of destroying it. One problem however, is that the targeting methodology has not caught up with current capabilities.

Aug. 1, 2021

A Whole-of-Government Response to the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative

The U.S. response to China’s “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI) might serve as the first—and best—litmus test for how both nations might manage the shifting geostrategic relationship. To achieve its strategic objectives, the U.S. will need to bring to bear the full weight of its instruments of national power. This paper will assess U.S. challenges and opportunities concerning the BRI through a strategic lens consisting of the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME) instruments of power. It will deliver key decision makers an array of options to consider as the U.S. seeks to address the BRI.

July 15, 2021

CAS Lessons Learned at the Combat Training Center

The following is a synopsis of CAS Lessons Learned from four Air Warrior (AW) exercises conducted in the spring and summer of 1993. Like a mission briefing, the important items are listed in order from start to finish. As Army data were not available at press time, this information comes exclusively from USAF AW reports. CAS lessons learned include a mix of predeployment, air-ground coordination, weapons employment, and post-attack considerations.

July 1, 2021

The Future of Air-Ground Integration: Linking Sensor to Shooter in the Deep Fight

The Joint Force’s ability to move, maneuver, and control territory will continue to rely heavily on joint fires to create conditions that provide the supported commander freedom of action. However, in order to keep pace in an operational environment, where adversary weapon systems present advanced capabilities and ephemeral windows of targetable vulnerability, joint fires must maximize connectivity across the Services and across disparate platforms to achieve that goal. On the modern battlefield, it is increasingly crucial to arm weapon systems with actionable data to achieve effects in a constrained amount of time.

June 14, 2021

Kill Box Update

Although kill boxes have been employed using various procedures since Desert Storm, recent attempts to refine kill box tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) may have generated confusion within the Services and the joint community. At the July 2008 Air Land Sea Application (ALSA) Center Joint Working Group (JWG) conducted to revise Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (MTTP) for Kill Box Employment, senior US Army and US Air Force doctrine representatives agreed to write this article to clarify the way ahead for this publication.

June 1, 2021

Less Is More

Although a relatively new tactic, this article focuses on the game plan because it is subjective in execution—leading to a wide variety of techniques across the CAS community. Also, the game plan illustrates the trend toward removing initiative from flight/section leaders, which, inherently, makes CAS tactics less flexible.