Results:
Tag: C2

June 15, 2022

Effective Airspace Management to Facilitate Fires – Establishing an Airspace Management Authority (AMA)

Article Originally Published in Air Land Sea Bulletin 2008-03, September 2008 It used to be enough to establish a coordinating altitude and communicate jointly only on those rare occasions when United States Army (USA) or United States Marine Corps (USMC) operations required venturing to higher altitudes. However, while the Air Force still maintains the preponderance of air assets, the airspace has become saturated with much more than USAF aircraft. Ground fires, Close Air Support (CAS) stacks, and a multitude of unmanned platforms occupying the same airspace will require a steady-state coordination mechanism for continuously servicing joint and coalition dynamic requests for airspace.

May 15, 2022

COORDINATION MEASURES

Many have heard of, and used, airspace coordinating measures (ACMs) and fire support coordination measures (FSCMs). Until a few years ago, as a graybeard combat airspace, air operations center (AOC) guy and former AOC formal training unit instructor (R2), and multi-tour air liaison officer (ALO) and former combat air operations center (CAOC) Chiefs of Combat Operations (p2 and Shaf), we thought ACMs restricted “things” from going through ACMs unless they were coordinated with a controlling agency. We thought ACMs protected aircraft orbiting in a restricted operating zone (ROZ) from other aircraft and fires (i.e., artillery, Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GLMRS), Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) etc.). We were wrong!

March 14, 2022

The Critical Role Space Plays in Enabling C2 (The Ultimate High Ground)

For more than 15 years, the American joint force has been involved in perpetual conflict. During this period, near-peer adversaries have been watching, learning about, and aggressively closing the gap on United States’ (US’) asymmetric technological advantages (e.g., precision; stealth; or unmanned; cyber; and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance). Further, US dominance across all phases of warfighting remains heavily reliant on the ability to maintain situational awareness (SA) for the joint force commander; execute a decision cycle much faster than adversaries; and, ultimately, C2 the joint force (one of seven joint functions essential to accomplishing any mission).

Feb. 28, 2022

Command, Control, and Communications in the Southwest Pacific Area Campaign (1943-45): A retrospective to inform future C2 and Competition in the Indo-Pacific

The current DoD and Indo-Pacific strategy calls for a dynamic forward posture and presence in Southeast Asia, South Asia, and Oceania (formerly the SWPA). While the communication challenges and operating environment remain largely unchanged, advanced 21st-century communication technologies will only be as effective as the sophisticated adversarial threat capabilities built to deny them. This retrospective intends to provide context for command and control, and communications for future competition and conflict (if required) in the South Pacific to maintain a free and open Indo-Pacific.

Dec. 1, 2021

Failing Forward - Disaggregated Command and Control in Strategic Competition

Currently, the Air Force has given lead wing commanders authority to conduct mission-type tactics, but these authorities have yet to be met with upgraded C2 capabilities nor the Airmen to effectively C2 lead wing assets in combat operations. Starting in World War II, the lead maneuver unit of the Air Force became the NAF, and NAF commanders conducted C2 of forces through assigned air operations centers (AOCs). However, AOCs now reside at the Major Command level effectively removing the primary C2 structure from both the NAF and lead wings. It is time for the Air Force to invest both dollars and manpower into rebuilding effective C2 capabilities within lead wings and across distant areas of responsibility (AORs)